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NOTES
TO DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE THE
PRESENCE OF AIDS: RESOLVING THE
CONFIDENTIALITY CONCERNS OF PATIENTS,
PHYSICIANS, AND THIRD PARTIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The ethics of the medical profession have, for centuries, regarded the
confidence between physicians and patients as sacred and secret., Accord-
ingly, physicians have an ethical duty to keep medical information confiden-
tial.2 In addition to their ethical duty, physicians have a common law duty
of nondisclosure of patients' medical information.3 The importance of the
physicians' duty to keep inviolate the intimate knowledge of their patients is
evidenced by the legal relief afforded to a patient whose confidential infor-
mation is disclosed to unauthorized parties.4
Although physicians may face legal action for disclosure of confidential
information, maintenance of confidentiality can also lead to a lawsuit.
Health care providers have been held liable for not disclosing patient infor-
mation to third parties who are later harmed by the nondisclosure. In gen-
eral, the duty to maintain confidentiality exists if disclosure could harm the
patient, while at the same time, a duty to disclose exists if confidentiality
could cause harm to a third party. Traditionally, these duties rarely over-
lapped. A recent development, however, has the potential of changing this
tradition. This development is Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome-
1. C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 15-
16 (1958); Selections from the Hippocratic Corpus, ETHICS IN MEDICINE 5,8 (S. Reiser, A.
Dyck, and W. Curran eds. (1977)); See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
2. C. COPPENS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND MEDICAL PRACTICE 138-39 (1905); C. DE-
WITr, supra note 1.
3. See infra notes 95-119 and accompanying text.
4. See generally Note, Extrajudicial Truthful Disclosure of Medical Confidences: A
Physician's Civil Liability, 44 DEN. L.J. 463 (1967) (examination of physicians' civil liability
for truthful disclosure of medical confidences). See also infra notes 95-119 and accompanying
text.
McVickar: To Disclose or Not to Disclose the Presence of Aids:  Resolving t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
342 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
AIDS.
Physicians treating a patient with AIDS must choose between the
Scylla and Charybdis of the confidentiality issue. Because victims of AIDS
face extreme discrimination, there is a duty to keep an AIDS patient's di-
agnosis confidential. On the other hand, AIDS is a contagious disease and
once contracted is almost certainly fatal. Thus, there is an opposing duty to
disclose information concerning AIDS patients. These duties are in direct
conflict, and a breach of either may result in a lawsuit.
This note explores the confidential relationship between physicians and
their patients and the effects AIDS may have on this relationship. Section
II first provides background information on the characteristics and epidemi-
ology of AIDS, and then discusses the problems that AIDS victims face as
a result of the social response to the disease. Section III surveys the issue of
confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship and focuses on the doc-
tor's liability for breach of confidentiality and concludes with a discussion
of exceptions to physician-patient confidentiality.
Section IV introduces the conflict between the confidentiality interests
of AIDS patients and the interests third parties may have in receiving con-
fidential AIDS information. This note concludes by proposing legislative
regulation by the adoption of a statute aimed at protecting physicians from
legal action for the disclosure or nondisclosure of information that identifies
AIDS patients to certain third parties.
II. THE AIDS CRISIS
A. History and Characteristics of the Disease
Although isolated cases may have occurred earlier, 5 the medical com-
munity was first alerted to the development of a severe immuno-depressant
disease in June of 1981.6 By June 1982, the Center for Disease Control7
5. Selik, Haverko & Cunnan, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Trends
in the United States, 76 AM. J. MED. 493 (1984).
6. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 32 CEN-
TERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 49 (Jan. 6, 1984). In
mid 1981, the Center for Disease Control received reports of several outbreaks of Pneumocys-
tic Carinii and Kaposi's Sarcoma in previously healthy young male homosexuals. Previously,
those diseases were essentially seen only in persons with severely compromised immunologic
defenses such as may result from immunosuppressive treatments for organ transplant. INSTI-
TUTE FOR MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS 37 (1986)
[hereinafter CONFRONTING AIDS].
7. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) was established as an operating health
agency within the Public Health Service by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
on July 1, 1973. The Center is the federal agency charged with protecting the public health of
the Nation by providing leadership and direction in the prevention and control of diseases and
other preventable conditions, and responding to public health emergencies. THE UNITED
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(CDC) had received over 350 reports of serious opportunistic infections,8
primarily affecting homosexuals and bisexuals, but also affecting intrave-
nous drug users, Haitians, and hemophiliacs. 9 Recognizing the common
symptom of depressed immunity as a characteristic of a new disease, the
CDC, in September of 1982, gave the disease a descriptive name-
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.10 The spread of AIDS has not
been exclusively limited to the previously mentioned high risk groups. Al-
though the AIDS epidemic is often associated with homosexual men, the
disease has proven to be nondiscriminatory-it affects heterosexuals as well,
including men, women, adults, children, Caucasians, and minorities.1
B. Epidemiology of the Disease
AIDS is caused by an infectious agent called Human Immunode-
ficiency Virus (HIV) . 2 HIV has been isolated from blood, semen, vaginal
fluids, saliva, tears, and breast milk.' This virus is transmitted through the
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1987/88, at 298 (June 2, 1987).
8. Opportunistic infections are infections caused by a microorganism that rarely
causes disease in persons with normal defense mechanisms. CONFRONTING AIDS supra note 6,
at 356.
9. Update on Kaposi's Sarcoma and Opportunistic Infections in Previously Healthy
Persons-United States, 31 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 29 (June 11, 1982).
10. Update on Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17 (Sept. 24,
1982). The CDC established a surveillance definition to monitor AIDS. Under this definition,
AIDS is "a reliably diagnosed disease process that is at least moderately predictive of a defect
in cell-mediated immunity occurring in a person with no known cause for diminished resis-
tance." The Case Definition of Aids Used by CDC for National Reporting, Doc. #0312S, Aug.
1, 1985.
11. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Update-United States, 32 CEN-
TERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 37 (June 24, 1983).
12. A. Macher, The Medical Background, in AIDS AND THE LAW 6 (W. Dornette ed.
1987). HIV is the causative agent of the immune deficiency. HIV is transmissible; the syn-
drome resulting from HIV infection-AIDS-is not. Id. at 7. Furthermore, mere infection by
HIV does not necessarily mean a person has AIDS. Rather, in order to say that someone has
AIDS the infection must become "full blown," which means that the victim is afflicted with
one or more of the opportunistic diseases which attack the infected person's immune system.
Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 141 (Jan. 17, 1986). However, a person
who tests positive for HIV must be assumed to be contagious even if the person fails to develop
AIDS. See Handsfield, Screening for HTLV-Ill Antibody, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 888
(1985) (correspondence stating that although persons who have tested positive for HIV infec-
tion must be assumed to be infectious, despite the person's failure to develop AIDS).
13. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type III]Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 128 (Nov. 15,
1985).
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exchange of various body fluids, which occurs via intimate sexual contact,
sharing contaminated needles, transfusion of whole blood or clotting factor
concentrates, and from infected mothers to their children at birth. 4 While
the virus has been isolated from blood, semen, vaginal fluids, saliva, tears,
and breast milk, studies have shown that only blood and semen effectively
transmit the disease.'5 Evidence indicates that casual contact, such as hug-
ging an infected individual, sharing the same eating utensils as an infected
individual, 6 or using the same toilet as an infected individual, does not
transmit HIV. 7 No cases have been reported of HIV being transmitted
through food, water, or air."8
C. Social Ramifications of the Disease
Despite the limited means by which the AIDS virus is transmitted, 9
the public is terrified that the disease will spread to the general popula-
tion.20 This fear has had disturbing effects both on society and its treatment
14. A. Macher, The Medical Background, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 12, at 7;
CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 6, at 52.
15. Provisional Public Health Service Inter-Agency Recommendations for Screening
Donated Blood and Plasma for Antibody to the Virus Causing Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome, 34 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 75
(Jan. 11, 1985); A. FETrNER & W. CHECK, THE TRUTH ABOUT AIDS 90 (rev. ed. 1985)
(identification of anal receptive intercourse as the contact most clearly linked to transmission
of human immunodeficiency virus); California Study Confirms Virus Transmission Routes, 2
AIDS POLICY & LAW, Feb. 11, 1987 at 7 (confirmation of the theory recognizing receptive
anal intercourse as the main route of transmission for the human immunodeficiency virus in
males).
16. CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 6, at 50. Epidemiological data indicate that con-
tact that does not involve sexual or parenteral exposure will not transmit HIV, despite the
virus' presence in saliva and tears. Id. at 50-51.
17. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 14, 1987, at 8, col. I (quoting Surgeon General C. Everett
Koop, "You don't get AIDS from shaking hands, sharing office machines or telephones, or
* . .from toilet seats.").
18. CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 6, at 6.
19. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
20. Dolgin, AIDS: Social Meanings and Legal Ramifications, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.
193, 198-99 (1985) (discussion of the public fear of AIDS and the media's role in augmenting
this fear).
A survey conducted by MODERN HEALTHCARE magazine indicated that:
a) thirty-three percent of the surveyed population believed that they were in some danger
of contracting AIDS;
b) twenty-nine percent believed they could contract AIDS in a hospital in which AIDS
patients were treated;
c) thirty-one percent thought they could become infected by using a public washroom;
and
d) thirty-five percent felt AIDS could be contracted in a restaurant employing AIDS
victims.
Anderson, 37% Fear Contracting AIDS in Hospitals, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Nov. 8, 1985, at
28.
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of AIDS victims. 21 People with AIDS, and even those merely suspected of
having AIDS, face a vast array of discrimination, 22 including discrimination
in employment, 23 housing, 2  insurance,25 and education.26 AIDS patients
have also faced discrimination in certain services.2 7 For example, people
with AIDS have been removed from airline flights, 2 charged extra fees for
dental service29 and denied funeral home service.s Cities and states across
the nation have responded to the discrimination faced by AIDS victims;
local governments have posed various antidiscrimination statutes,31 and sev-
21. The hysteria surrounding AIDS has caused some churches to discontinue the shar-
ing of the communion cup and has caused some politicians to stop shaking hands in public.
AIDS: LEGAL ASPECT OF A MEDICAL CRIsIs 725 (1986). See also D. ALTMAN, AIDS IN THE
MIND OF AMERICA 16-21 (1986) (analysis of the fear, hysteria, and stigma attached to
AIDS).
22. The discrimination associated with AIDS may result from a fear of infection from
casual contact stemming from a misunderstanding of the modes of transmission or may be a
result of prejudice against the behavior of those most at risk for AIDS or HIV infection. See
Dolgin, supra note 20, at 197-200.
23. AIDS-related employment discrimination has manifested itself in the automatic
dismissal of employees with AIDS, the conditioning of employment on the taking of an AIDS-
screening test, and the refusal of employers to hire individuals suspected of belonging to a high
risk group. AIDS: LEGAL ASPECTS OF A MEDICAL CRISIs 725 (1986); 2 AIDS POLICY &
LAW, Apr. 22, 1987 at 8 (United Kingdom industrial tribunal upheld the firing of a gay
employee over AIDS fears); 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Aug. 26, 1987 at 4 (Staff physician with
AIDS prohibited from performing invasive procedures on patients); See generally I BIOLAW,
1986-87 Highlights §§ 3-8, at 1006-07 (1988) (examples of AIDS-related employment
discrimination).
24. 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Dec. 3, 1986 at 3 (opportunity to purchase Co-op apart-
ment refused to physicians who treat AIDS patients); 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Feb. 12, 1986
at 6 (real estate brokerage instituted policy of informing potential purchasers that property
seller had AIDS). AIDS-related housing discrimination has also resulted in evictions and lock-
outs of tenants with AIDS. AIDS: LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL CRIsIs 727 (1986). See also
AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 14, at 78-85 (comparison of the sale of a home in which a
family was murdered to the sale of a home in which a resident died of AIDS).
25. 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, June 3, 1987 at 5 (gay rights organization alleges insur-
ance agents refuse to consider policy applications from gays); 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Feb.
11, 1987 at 5 (HIV testing as part of insurance application process); 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW,
Dec. 17, 1986 at 6 (AIDS victim won return of health coverage).
26. 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Nov. 5, 1986 at 2 (school district sued for expelling child
with AIDS); 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Aug. 27, 1986 at 3 (Georgia school board bans students
and teachers with AIDS). AIDS-related discrimination in education has resulted in teachers,
students, and siblings of students with AIDS being expelled from classrooms. AIDS: LEGAL
ASPECTS OF A MEDICAL CRIsIs 726 (1986) [hereinafter LEGAL ASPECTS].
27. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 26, at 725-28.
28. 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Feb. 25, 1987 at 8 (passenger with AIDS denied
transportation).
29. 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Dec. 31, 1986 at 2 (Oregon dentists cautioned against
charging AIDS patients extra control costs because of possible violation of patients' civil
rights).
30. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 26, at 726.
31. See, e.g., 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, May 20, 1987 at 3 (California cities ban AIDS
19891
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eral states have moved to prohibit AIDS-related discrimination.82 Addition-
ally, antidiscrimination guidelines have been proposed by several civil rights
groups."3
On March 3, 1987, in the case of School Board v. Arline, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that recipients of federal monies may not dis-
criminate against contagious disease victims.34 The Court, in a seven to two
decision, held that contagious diseases are handicaps within the meaning of
federal law, and thus discrimination against those suffering from a conta-
gious disease is prohibited.3 5 Although Arline involved tuberculosis rather
than AIDS, the reasoning of the opinion suggests that a person suffering
from any disease is protected from discrimination that results from an irra-
tional fear of contagion. 6
Despite the movement toward protection against discrimination, AIDS
victims still face discrimination and social isolation based on society's fear
of contagion." Because of the public's adverse reaction to AIDS, the dis-
semination of information regarding AIDS patients has become a legal and
ethical issue. Generally, this issue involves two conflicting interests: the
AIDS victims' interest in concealing their condition and the public's inter-
est in promoting health and safety. Since physicians have both the responsi-
bility to promote public health and the duty to maintain the confidentiality
of a patient's medical information, they are in the middle of this conflict.
discrimination).
32. 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Sept. 10, 1986 at 4 (AIDS as a handicap under Michigan
law prohibiting handicap bias); 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Feb. 25, 1987 at 2 (California Fair
Employment and Housing Commission declared AIDS a handicap under state law).
33. 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW, April 9, 1986 at 4 (ACLU policy emphasizes that the risk
of AIDS shall not be used as a pretext for discriminatory treatment).
34. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). Arline involved a Florida teacher who was removed from the
classroom because of the fear that she would infect students with tuberculosis. This case
presented the question of whether a person with a contagious disease could be considered a
handicapped individual within the meaning of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Section
504 prohibits a federally funded state program from discriminating against a handicapped
individual because of the person's handicap. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
35. Arline, supra note 34, at 288.
36. Id. at 282. Justice Brennan, in a footnote, stated "this case does not present ...
the question whether a carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to
have a physical impairment, or whether such a person could be considered, solely on basis of
contagiousness, a handicapped person .. " Id. at 282, n.7. AIDS was distinguished from
tuberculosis because AIDS, unlike tuberculosis, can be asymptomatic while tuberculosis pro-
duces both physical impairment and contagiousness. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan stated that
the basic purpose of § 504 is to ensure "that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or
other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others," including dis-
crimination based on the irrational fear of a disease. Id. at 284.
37. See infra notes 159-74 and accompanying text.
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III. THE CONFIDENTIALITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND
PATIENTS
Both privacy and confidentiality 8 are significant components of medi-
cal care and treatment, specifically of the physician-patient relationship.39
A patient's privacy interests encompass the right to control the information
relative to the patient's conditions.40 Unauthorized access to such informa-
tion constitutes a violation of privacy. 41 Once the information is divulged by
the patient to the physician, however, it is no longer private;42 once commu-
nicated, the information becomes confidential. 43
Private information is often disclosed by patients to their physician be-
cause confidentiality is assured.44 Patients disclose personal information to
their doctors while being examined or receiving treatment. Thus, patients
38. Privacy and confidentiality are terms used to describe the opposite of publicity, and
therefore the words are often used interchangeably. Winslade, Confidentiality of Medical
Records, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 497, 502 (1982). Nevertheless, privacy and confidentiality are con-
ceptually different. Privacy refers to control over personal information, while confidentiality
refers to the truth given to another to preserve private information. Winslade & Ross, Privacy,
Confidentiality, and Autonomy in Psychotherapy, 64 NEB. L. REV. 578, 594 (1985).
39. Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 323, 324 (1975) (ac-
count of the value of privacy and confidentiality in establishing and maintaining various rela-
tionships); M. MACDONALD, K. MEYER & B. ESSIG, HEALTH CARE LAW § 19.02 (1987) (ex-
planation of patients' right of confidentiality and the underlying policies); Adams, Medical
Research and Personal Privacy, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1087 (1985) (discussion of confidenti-
ality's role in the physician-patient relationship); LeBlang, Invasion of Privacy: Medical Prac-
tice and the Tort of Intrusion, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 205 (1979) (examination of the nature and
scope of the right to privacy as it affects the medical profession).
40. See generally LeBlang, supra note 39, at 205-07; D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 20-22 (1979) (discussion of the concept of privacy).
41. LeBlang, supra note 39, at 218. For example, a person's privacy is invaded when a
physician takes a patient's photograph without authorization even if the picture is for medical
purposes. Id. See also DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881) (physician's
liability for allowing, without consent, an assistant to aid in delivery of a child); Inderbitzen v.
Lane Hospital, 124 Cal. App. 462, 12 P.2d 744 (1932) (teaching hospital's treatment of dis-
robed female patient, which included prodding and poking by ten to twelve men, was an inva-
sion of privacy).
42. O'BRIEN, supra note 40, at 11; Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV.
34 (1967) (discussion of the various meanings given to privacy and confidentiality); Winslade
& Ross, supra note 38, at 519-33.
43. Winslade & Ross, supra note 38, at 594; Adams, supra note 39. "Unlike privacy,
confidentiality does not refer to self-concerns at all." Winslade, supra note 38, at 503. "Pri-
vacy concerns control over access and disclosure in the first instance; confidentiality concerns
only redisclosure of information previously disclosed." Id. at 503.
44. It should be noted that confidentiality does not merely flow from the disclosure of
private information. Instead, confidentiality is a product of the nature of the information and
the relationship between the information's discloser and its recipient. Winslade & Ross, supra
note 38, at 503.
1989]
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expect that their information will be kept confidential. 45 This expectation is
a result of professional ethics, state statutes, and tort law. 46
A. Ethical Origins of the Physician's Duty Not to Disclose
Among physicians' venerable duties is the duty to keep secret and invi-
olate the intimate knowledge of a patient's health.47 This duty was embod-
ied in an oath developed by the ancient physician Hippocrates over 2,000
years ago48 and has subsequently been adopted by the American Medical
Association (AMA). 49 The AMA Revised Principles of Medical Ethics
states that a physician "shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues,
and of other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences
within the constraints of the law." 50 This principle is not a law,51 but rather
a standard of conduct forbidding the voluntary disclosure of medical confi-
dences. Confidentiality promotes patient trust, which facilitates the disclo-
sure of personal information necessary for complete health care.5" Because
45. Cooper, The Physician's Dilemma: Protection of the Patient's Right to Privacy, 22
ST. Louis U.L.J. 397 (1978) (examination of problems relating to physicians' disclosure of
patients' medical information); Note, Action for Breach of Medical Secrecy Outside the
Courtroom, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 103, 109 (1967).
46. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 45; Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain
Role of the Physician in the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.L. REV. 255, 266 (1984).
Winslade, supra note 38, at 510. Sloan & Hall, Confidentiality of Psychotherapeutic Records,
5 J. LEGAL MED. 435 (1984).
47. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN & PATIENT 23
(1958).
48. The Hippocratic Oath, the guiding ethical code of ancient Greek physicians, is one
of the most enduring traditions in Western medicine. The Oath, in its most compelling portion,
states: "[W]hatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession, as well as outside my
profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will
never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets." Hippocrates, Selections from the Hip-
pocratic Corpus: Oath, in ETHICS IN MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 5.
49. AMERICAN MEDICAL SOCIETY, REVISED PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1980)
[hereinafter AMA PRINCIPLES].
50. AMA PRINCIPLES, supra note 49, at § IV. It is interesting to note that prior to
revision, the Principles provided that:
[A] physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medi-
cal attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of patients, unless he
is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary to protect the welfare of the
individual or of the community.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § IX (1977). The Re-
vised Principles' limitation on disclosures-"within the constraints of the law"--is less useful
in guiding physicians who must make a confidential disclosure to protect the welfare of a third
party under a Tarasoff duty. See infra notes 135 to 146 and accompanying text.
51. The preamble to the Revised Principles describes the principles as "standards of
conduct which define the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician." AMA PRINCI-
PLES, supra note 49.
52. Winslade, supra note 38, at 505; See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224,
177 N.W. 831 (1920). In Simonsen, unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by a
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 3
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of the physician's standard of professional conduct which protects confiden-
tiality, generations of patients have freely disclosed their most intimate and
delicate secrets to their doctors. 53
B. Statutory Origins of the Duty Not to Disclose
1. Federal Bases of Liability
The ethical duty of nondisclosure embodied in the Hippocratic Oath is
included in some federal statutes and provides the basis of liability for
breach of confidentiality." Federal statutes and regulations provide limited
protection for confidentiality of patient information gathered by federal
agencies or programs. 55 For example, Federal Medicare regulations estab-
lish the confidentiality of medical records of patients admitted for care in a
hospital." Similarly, the regulations issued pursuant to the Comprehensive
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation
Act57 and the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 197258 provide pro-
tection of confidential patient information gathered in connection with the
performance of any government alcohol or drug abuse program. 59 Although
the protection of the applicable information is quite comprehensive, such
regulations only apply to a limited amount of patient information. 0 Fur-
physician gave rise to civil liability. The Judge stated that, "[t]he relation of physician and
patient is necessarily a highly confidential one. It is often necessary for the patient to give
information about himself which would be most embarrassing or harmful to him if given gen-
eral circulation." Id. at 226-27, 177 N.W. at 832.
53. Winslade, supra note 38, at 505.
54. Cooper, supra note 45, at 412.
55. See Winslade, supra note 38, at 516.
56. 42 C.F.R. § 482.24 (1986). Subchapter C-Basic Hospital Functions--of the fed-
eral regulations issued under the Health Care Financing Administration states in part that:
"[A] hospital must have a medical record service that has administrative responsibility for
medical records. A medical record must be maintained for every individual evaluated or
treated in the hospital." Id.
The hospital must have procedures for ensuring the confidentiality of patient records. In-
formation from or copies of records may be released only to authorized individuals, and the
hospital must ensure that unauthorized individuals cannot gain access to or alter patient
records. 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(b) (1987).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4541-93 (1982).
58. 21 U.S.C. §§ 1101-94 (1982).
59. The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment and Re-
habilitation Act and the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 share a common set of
regulations, which provide for the unauthorized disclosure of patient information only in a
medical emergency, under a court order, or to qualified personnel for the purpose of con-
ducting scientific research, management or financial audits, or program evaluations. See 42
C.F.R. §§ 2.1 to 2.67-1 (1987).
60. Gellman, supra note 46, at 277. Winslade, supra note 38, at 517. In addition to the
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, a broad cate-
gory of laws prevents the government from disclosing medical information to third parties.
1989] 349
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thermore, federal statutes that protect confidential health care information
only apply to physicians who practice in federal agencies or under a federal
program. Consequently, federal regulations do not provide practitioners
outside the federal government with legislative guidance for determining
when disclosure of confidential information is permissible.
2. State Statutory Bases of Liability
a. Direct statutory protection of confidentiality
Statutory protection of confidential information is most fully articu-
lated at the state level. Several state legislatures have passed statutes pro-
tecting confidential medical information.61 Generally, state legislation may
address the kind of information protected, to whom the information may or
may not be disclosed, and the necessity of consent for disclosure. 2 An ex-
ample of such a statute is Rhode Island's comprehensive confidentiality
statute.6" The purpose of the Rhode Island Confidentiality of Health Care
Information Act is to "establish safeguards for maintaining the integrity of
confidential health care information that relates to an individual. '64 This
statute prevents unauthorized disclosure of confidential health care infor-
mation except in eighteen limited situations.65 Comprehensive statutes such
Note, Public Health Protection and the Privacy of Medical Records, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 265, 282-85 (1981).
61. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-8 (Supp. 1988) (to be repealed December 31, 1997)
(confidentiality of abortion records); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 111 para. 4450 (1985) (confidential-
ity of information disclosed at physician disciplinary hearings); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
2263 (West Supp. 1988) (stating that the willful, unauthorized violation of professional confi-
dence constitutes unprofessional conduct).
62. Winslade, supra note 38, at 519.
63. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3 (Supp. 1987).
64. Id.
65. The Rhode Island Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act allows for the
unauthorized disclosure of confidential health care information in the following situations:
(1) To a physician, dentist or other medical personnel who believes in good faith that
such information is necessary for diagnosis or treatment of such individual in a medical
or dental emergency, or
(2) To medical peer review committees, or the board of medical review; or
(3) To qualified personnel for the purpose of conducting scientific research, management
audits, financial audits, program evaluations, actuarial, insurance underwriting, or similar
studies, provided such personnel shall not identify, directly or indirectly, any individual
patient in any report of such research, audit, or evaluation, or otherwise disclose patient
identities in any manner; or
(4) By a health care provider to appropriate law enforcement personnel, or to a person if
the health care provider believes that person or his family to be in danger from a patient,
or to appropriate law enforcement personnel if the patient has or is attempting to obtain
narcotic drugs from the health care provider illegally, or to appropriate law enforcement
personnel or appropriate child protective agencies if the patient is a minor child who the
health care provider believes, after providing health care services to such patient, to have
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as Rhode Island's protect patient information and provide guidance for phy-
sicians' disclosure of health care information consistent with the ethical
considerations of the Hippocratic Oath.6 6 Nevertheless, existing state stat-
utes that directly protect confidentiality do not provide sufficient guidance
to physicians who treat patients with communicable diseases.67
Courts have consistently held that the physicians' duty of nondisclosure
may be outweighed by the duty to protect third parties. However, current
state statutory protection of physician-patient confidentiality fails to author-
been physically or psychologically abused or to law enforcement personnel in the case of
a gunshot wound reportable under § 11-47-48; or
(5) Between or among qualified personnel and health care providers within the health
care system for purposes of coordination of health care services given to the patient and
for purposes of education and training within the same health care facility; or
(6) To third party health insurers for the purpose of adjudicating health insurance
claims; or
(7) To a malpractice insurance carrier or lawyer if the health care provider has reason to
anticipate a medical liability action; or
(8) To a court or lawyer or medical liability insurance carrier if a patient brings a medi-
cal liability action against a health care provider; or
(9) To public health authorities in order to carry out their functions . .. ; or
(10) To the state medical examiner in the event of a fatality that comes under his juris-
diction; or
(I1) In relation to information that is directly related to current claim for workers' com-
pensation benefits or to any proceeding before the workers' compensation commission or
before any court proceeding related to workers' compensation; or
(12) To the attorneys for a health care provider whenever such provider considers such
release of information to be necessary in order to receive adequate legal representation; or
(13) By a health care provider to appropriate school authorities of disease, health screen-
ing and/or immunization required by the school; or when a school age child transfers
from one (1) school or school district to another school or school district; or
(14) To a law enforcement authority to protect the legal interests of an insurance institu-
tion agent or insurance support organization in preventing and prosecuting the perpetra-
tion of fraud upon them; or
(15) To a grand jury or to a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a subpoena or a
subpoena duces tecum when said information is required for the investigation or prosecu-
tion of criminal wrongdoing by a health care provider relating to his/her/its provisions of
health care services and said information is unavailable from any other source; provided
however, that any information so obtained shall not be admissible in any criminal pro-
ceeding against the patient to whom said information pertains; or
(16) To the state board of elections pursuant to a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum
when said information is required to determine the eligibility of a person to vote by mail
ballot and/or the legitimacy of a certification by a physician attesting to a voter's illness
or disability; or
(17) To certify. . . the nature and permanency of a person's illness or disability. .. ; or
(18) To the central cancer registry. ...
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(b) (Supp. 1987).
66. Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-2 (1987) (purpose of the statute is to maintain
the integrity of individual's confidentiality) with the Hippocratic Oath, supra note 48.
67. See generally Gellman, supra note 46, at 280 (noting that state confidentiality stat-
utes do not always guide physicians who wish to disclose confidential information).
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ize the disclosure of patient information to endangered third parties. 8
Therefore, additional legislation is needed to define when and how physi-
cians may disclose a patient's medical information and when the duty to do
so arises.
b. State licensing and privilege statutes
In addition to direct statutory protection of confidentiality, state courts
have also based the physicians' duty not to disclose on testimonial privilege
and licensing statutes.69 Testimonial privilege statutes generally provide
that a physician cannot testify in a court proceeding about patient informa-
tion gained in the course of treatment.70 This is a privilege exercised at the
patient's discretion and is similar to the privilege recognized for confidential
communications between attorney and client"1 and between husband and
wife.72 Although the privilege is a useful device for resolving some confiden-
tiality problems faced by physicians, testimonial privilege statutes only ap-
ply when a physician is testifying in court or in court-related proceedings.73
As a result, the testimonial privilege does not govern the disclosure of infor-
mation outside of the courtroom. Nevertheless, some courts have relied on
the public policy reflected in testimonial statutes to find liability for a physi-
cian's disclosure of patient information.74
68. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(b) (1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 56 (West
1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-301 (1981) (repealed 1987).
69. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swanson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (violation of
statutory provisions governing the licensing of physicians gave rise to a cause of action for
breach of confidentiality); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (state licens-
ing statute indicative of public policy requiring information obtained by a physician in the
course of a doctor-patient relationship be maintained in confidence); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah
2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958) (reliance upon testimonial privilege statute to establish a duty of
confidentiality); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (liability
for unauthorized disclosure implied in state testimonial privilege statute); Hammonds v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (duty of secrecy reflected in the
state privileged communication statute and in the state medical licensing statute); Felis v.
Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d 441, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (court relied on the public
policy underlying the testimonial privilege statute to find a violation of the privileged and
confidential relationship of physician and patient).
70. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 990-1007 (West Supp. 1988).
71. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West 1966).
72. See, e.g., id. at § 980.
73. Gellman, supra note 46, at 272; B. FURROW, S. JOHNSON, T. Jos & R.
SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW 221-22 (1987) [hereinafter HEALTH LAW].
74. Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958). In Berry, the Supreme
Court of Utah relied on policy behind the state testimonial privilege statute. The court stated
that the privileged communication statute was grounded upon the necessity of full disclosure
by a patient of conditions or symptoms relating to diagnosis. Id. at 193, 331 P.2d at 816; See
also Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Simon-
sen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
Testimonial privilege statutes are a public recognition of the special nature of the doctor-
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In the absence of testimonial privilege statutes, courts have relied on
state licensing statutes as a basis for finding a duty on the part of physi-
cians not to disclose confidential information.7 5 Like testimonial privilege
statutes, physician licensing statutes also require doctors to maintain a con-
fidential relationship with their patients.7 6 Licensing statutes generally im-
pose a duty of confidentiality as a condition on the professional practice of
medicine.7 7 Courts have thus interpreted licensing statutes as the basis for a
legal duty upon physicians not to disclose confidential information."' Conse-
quently, disclosure of patient information may give rise to liability for all
damages naturally flowing from the breach.79
Testimonial privilege and physician licensing statutes insure that pa-
tients may freely disclose personal information to their doctors without fear
that the physician could, without impunity, disclose intimacies that would
harm or embarrass the patient. 80 Such statutes are instrumental in protect-
ing patients from their physicians' unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information.8 However, these statutes fail to acknowledge the situations in
which the need to protect third parties may outweigh the duty of nondisclo-
sure. Consequently, physicians need additional guidance regarding the ex-
ceptions to the duty of confidentiality.
82
patient relationship. If public policy prohibits a physician from testifying in court as to infor-
mation obtained in the course of treatment, the policy should also prohibit a doctor from pub-
licly revealing his patient's confidences. See Note, Extrajudicial Truthful Disclosure of Medi-
cal Confidences: A Physician's Civil Liability, 44 DEN. L.J. 463, 472 (1967).
75. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832 (licensing stat-
ute imposed a duty upon the physician not to disclose professional confidences); Clark v. Ger-
aci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 792-93, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (state licensing regulation expresses a
standard on which a patient has a right to rely).
76. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4433(4) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
77. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2234 (West 1984); See also Note, supra note
45, at 112.
78. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920). The Simon-
sen court stated:
By this [medical licensing] statute, it appears to us, a positive duty is imposed upon
the physician, both for the benefit and advantage of the patient as well as in the interest
of general public policy. The relation of physician and patient is necessarily a highly
confidential one .... A wrongful breach of such confidence, and a betrayal of such trust,
would give rise to a civil action for the damages naturally flowing from such wrong.
Id. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
79. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text; see also HEALTH LAW, supra note
72, at 218-19.
80. See Cooper, supra note 45, at 412.
81. See Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1984) (absence of a state physician-
patient testimonial privilege statute was evidence of a public interest in disclosure to obtain a
determination of a controversy); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249
(1965) (absence of testimonial privilege or licensing statutes was evidence that a physician had
no duty to treat a medical report as confidential).
82. See infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
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C. Common Law Actions for Breach of Confidentiality
In the absence of state or federal statutes, courts have generally recog-
nized the right of a patient to recover damages for a physician's unautho-
rized disclosure of medical information. Liability for a physician's breach of
confidentiality has been based on breach of contract, defamation, and inva-
sion of privacy. 83
1. Breach of Contract
The relationship between physician and patient is usually viewed as an
implied contract, s and within this contract courts have found an implied
covenant of secrecy.85 This covenant of secrecy assures a patient that the
disclosure of personal information to their doctor in the course of treatment
or diagnosis will remain confidential.86 Thus, a physician's breach of confi-
dentiality is a violation of the physician's implied contractual obligation,81
83. See infra notes 84-105 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d
201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (physician impliedly covenants to keep in confidence
all disclosures made by a patient as well as all matters discovered during the examination and
treatment); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958) (finding libel as a basis of
liability for a physician's disclosure of derogatory information concerning a patient); Home v.
Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (physician's release of patient information consti-
tuted an invasion of the patient's privacy).
See also Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960). In Clark,
a physician disclosed to his patient's employer that alcoholism was the illness causing the pa-
tient's absence from work. Id., 208 N.Y.S.2d at 566. The patient subsequently sued the physi-
cian for breach of confidentiality. Id. Clark is unique because the patient alleged that the
physician's disclosure was professional incompetence, and thus based the suit on medical mal-
practice. The Clark court suggested that breach of confidentiality was unprofessional conduct,
but nonetheless held that the patient waived his right to confidentiality, and thus held for the
physician. Id. at 793, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
84. HEALTH CARE, supra note 69, at 195.
An implied contract is usually the basis of the relationship between a doctor and a
patient. When a patient goes to a doctor's office with a particular problem, he is offering,
to enter into a contract with the doctor. When the doctor examines the patient, she ac-
cepts the offer and an implied contract is created.
Id. at 194; See also Note, supra note 57, at 104-06.
85. See Note, supra note 45, at 104; see, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (implied condition of contract is that any confi-
dential information gained through the doctor-patient relationship will not be released without
the patient's permission); Quarles v. Southerland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965)
(reference to the contractual relationship between physicians and their patients in relation to a
breach of secrecy).
86. MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 483, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982) (finding an
implied covenant that requires doctors to keep in confidence all disclosures necessary to diag-
nosis and treatment of the patient's mental or physical condition); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d at
210, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
87. See Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 438, 390 N.E.2d 945, 948 (1979)
("for all practical purposes, the breach of a confidential relationship and the breach of contract
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for which an injured patient can recover. 88
Although the implied contractual relationship between physician and
patient is generally accepted, courts have frequently applied other theories89
to establish a basis of liability for breach of confidentiality.90 Traditionally,
awards for breach of contract have been limited to reliance damages and
compensatory or restitution damages.91 The difficulty in applying contract
damages to an injury arising out of disclosure of confidential information
may explain the limited use of contract theory as a basis for liability in
breach of confidentiality cases.9 2
2. Defamation
Courts frequently consider defamation93 in their analysis of liability for
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information." Although no court
has held a physician liable for unauthorized disclosure based solely on defa-
mation, defamation has been acknowledged as a basis for liability.95 Courts
that have considered defamation as a potential basis of liability have ex-
are probably co-extensive").
88. See Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 708, 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30.
89. See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. at 710, 287 So. 2d at 831-32 (citing opinions
from other jurisdictions to establish contract theory of liability between doctor and patient).
91. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CorRACTS 590-93 (3d ed. 1987). The
objective of contract damages is to place the aggrieved party in the same economic position he
would have been in had the contract been performed. Thus, contract damages are limited to
those which were reasonably contemplated by both parties at the time the contract was made.
Id.
92. For an example of the difficulty courts face in applying contract damages to medi-
cal injuries see Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973). See also Miller,
The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WASH. L.Q. 413, 416-23.
Limiting recovery to breach of contract generally limits a person to economic loss flowing
directly from the breach. In such a situation, the injured party would be precluded from recov-
ering for mental distress, loss of employment, or deterioration of marriage. See MacDonald v.
Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1982). Since the primary injuries in
breach of confidentiality cases are emotional injuries, contract law provides a problematic basis
of liability. Furthermore, punitive damages are generally not available for breach of contract.
See Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (discussion of whether
punitive damages could be awarded for breach of implied contract).
93. The tort of defamation arises in two forms: libel, the publication of defamatory
matters, and slander, the conveyance of defamatory matter through oral communication. W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 785 (5th ed. 1984).
94. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920); Berry v.
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958); France v. St. Claire's Hosp., 82 A.D.2d 1, 441
N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981) (libel suit alleging hospital's disclosure to third party falsely stated plain-
tiff was afflicted with venereal disease).
95. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. at 229, 177 N.W. at 832 (court indicated
that disclosure of a patient's communicable disease to an unauthorized party should be gov-
erned by the tort of defamation).
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pressed concern over the need to protect patients from physicians' unautho-
rized disclosure of private information. Courts also see the tort of defama-
tion as one manner in which a patient's private information can be
protected.96 Defamation, therefore, is a useful tool for imposing liability on
physicians for the disclosure of a patient's confidential information.97
3. Breach of Privacy
Prior to 1890, no court had considered granting relief expressly based
on a breach of privacy; however in 1890, an influential law review article
introduced the concept of the right to privacy.9 Since the introduction of
privacy rights, invasion of privacy has steadily evolved as a tort.99 In gen-
eral, the specific tort for breach of privacy is composed of the intrusion or
interference with private affairs, the appropriation of a name or likeness,
the creation of a false light in the public eye, and the public disclosure, even
if truthful, of private facts.' A physician's disclosure of confidential infor-
mation thus falls within the tort of breach of privacy. 110
Courts have frequently applied the tort of breach of privacy to physi-
cians' unauthorized disclosure of patient information. 02 In general, courts
96. See Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 229, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920); Berry v.
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
97. Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d at 196, 331 P.2d at 817 (finding libel as a basis of
liability for any injury suffered by a patient as a result of a physician's disclosure of derogatory
confidential information).
98. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 93, at 849. In 1890 Samual D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis published in the Harvard Law Review their now famous article on privacy.
The article reviewed a number of cases which concerned either defamation, invasion of prop-
erty rights, breach of implied contract, or breach of confidence, and concluded that relief in
each case was actually provided based upon a common principle, which was the right to pri-
vacy. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
99. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 93, at 849 (discussion of the expansion
of privacy actions into the realm traditionally held by the tort of defamation). Privacy rights
have also extended into the realm of constitutional law. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), the Supreme Court found that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contracep-
tives unconstitutionally invaded the privacy rights of married couples.
100. Breach of privacy is generally limited to the appropriation of a name or likeness,
the unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, the public disclosure of private facts,
or the creation of a false light in the public eye. See W. PROSSER & W. KEEToN, supra note
93, at 851-65.
101. See Note, supra note 45, at 107.
102. Home v. Patton, 289 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (disclosure of information
acquired in the course of the physician-patient relationship constituted an invasion of the pa-
tient's privacy); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977) (psychiatrist who
extensively reported a disclosure made by a former patient had invaded the patient's privacy);
Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (physician's
unauthorized disclosure of a patient's confidential communications held to violate the privacy
of the patient).
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that recognize a patient's right to recover for breach of privacy have con-
sistently based their decisions on the confidential nature of the information
disclosed.10 3 As with breach of contract and defamation, a patient's recov-
ery for breach of privacy stems from the realization that, for effective medi-
cal care, a patient must disclose to his or her physician information that
may be embarrassing, disgraceful, or incriminating.10 4 Courts have held
that patients intend the disclosure of personal information to be private;
consequently, a physician's revelation of a patient's confidence would effect
an invasion of that patient's privacy.20 5
The existing common law actions for breach of confidentiality would
be sufficient guidance for physicians' disclosure of confidential information
if the physicians only duty was to protect patient confidences. 0 6 However,
physicians' duties are not so one-sided. On the contrary, physicians may
have an equal duty to disclose patient information to third parties. 07 There-
fore, physicians need further guidance to avoid liability for the disclosure or
nondisclosure of confidential information.
D. Exceptions to Confidentiality-The Duty to Disclose
There are several legal exceptions to the confidentiality of doctor-pa-
tient communications. 0 8 Perhaps the most obvious of these exceptions is
waiver of confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship.10 9 Statutory
103. See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoades, Inc., 492 A.2d
580 (D.C. App. 1985) (plastic surgeon's public display of "before" and "after" photographs of
a former patient invaded the privacy of the patient based upon the patient's expectations that
the photographs would not be publicized without consent); Valencia v. Duval Corp., 132 Ariz.
348, 645 P.2d 1262 (1982) (company physician's disclosure of employee's medical records did
not constitute invasion of privacy since no confidential medical facts were disclosed; the infor-
mation disclosed already appeared in the employee's employment record).
104. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965);
Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973).
105. Id.; Valencia v. Duval Corp., 132 Ariz. 348, 645 P.2d 1262 (1982); Doe v. Roe, 93
Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977).
106. Tarasoff v. Bd. of Regents, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976)
(physician's maintenance of a patient's confidentiality was insufficient for the physician to es-
cape liability for not disclosing a patient's intent to commit violence). See infra notes 108-56
and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 108-56 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 110-56 and accompanying text.
109. See Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965) (patient's claim
based on a physician's unauthorized disclosure of information to the attorney of a potential
defendant was dismissed because the information would be discoverable if the patient sued the
potential defendant); Acosta v. Casy, 365 So. 2d 4 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (employee claiming
workers' compensation for a work-connected injury waived his right to privacy with respect to
all information relevant to the claim); Jordan v. Kelly, 728 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (plaintiff's
failure to object to allegedly privileged testimony constitutes waiver of that privilege, thus
plaintiff could not recover for damages arising from the testimony).
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compulsion is another exception to a physician's general duty of nondisclo-
sure. Statutory exceptions to physician-patient confidentiality generally
mandate the disclosure of specific diseases or injuries to state authorities.110
For example, physicians may have a statutory duty to report gunshot
wounds,"1 injuries which indicate child abuse,"' or communicable diseases
to the proper state agencies. Such statutes, however, do not govern the dis-
closure of AIDS information to parties other than state authorities.,"8 Nev-
ertheless, courts have held that such statutes imply the existence of a physi-
cian's duty to alert third parties about a patient's malady."14 An implicit
duty to alert, however, only serves to intensify the disclosure conflict espe-
cially when the information to be disclosed is AIDS related." 5 Conse-
quently, reporting statutes inadequately regulate physician-patient confiden-
tiality unless they are equipped with express provisions that detail the
prevention or authorization of physicians' disclosure.
Pursuant to state reporting statutes, a physician is required to reveal
patient medical information to state authorities."16 In addition, a physician
is generally allowed to reveal patient information in instances in which the
welfare of others may be adversely affected." 7 This exception to the confi-
dentiality duty is included in the physician's professional code of ethics" 8
and has been set forth by various state courts." 9 Unlike a statutory duty to
disclose patient information, the permissive authority granted to physicians
by their ethical code and by case law is discretionary. 10
110. See Cooper, supra note 42, at 403.
111. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11160-61 (West 1982).
112. Id., §§ 11165-74 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
113. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3125 (West 1979).
114. All jurisdictions require the reporting of AIDS cases to state or local health depart-
ments. Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, South Carolina, and Wisconsin re-
quire positive tests for HIV to be reported. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 12, at 349-50;
see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.5-2(b)(1) (West 1987).
115. See, e.g., Peck v. Counseling Serv. of Addison Co., 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985), Mc-
Intosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1978); but see Gammill v. United
States, 727 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a state reporting statute does not impose a
duty on physicians to warn third parties unless the physician is aware of the specific risks to
the specific parties).
116. See infra notes 157-86 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5213 (1980) (requiring physicians to report
every case of a hazardous communicable disease to agencies designated by the state depart-
ment of health).
118. "A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of med-
ical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of patients, unless it be-
comes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or community." AMA PRIN-
CIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNSEL, § 9 (1984). Cf.
WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF GENEVA, which merely states "I will re-
spect the secrets which are confided in me."
119. See infra notes 122-56 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 123-56 and accompanying text.
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In certain situations, however, a physician's discretionary right to over-
ride the duty of confidentiality becomes a legal duty to inform third parties
of confidential information. 21 Based on this duty to third parties, a physi-
cian who treats a patient for a communicable disease may be liable for
failing to relay the diagnosis of the disease's infectious nature to family
members and health care workers who are likely to come in contact with
the patient. 122 The duty imposed on physicians who treat patients with com-
municable diseases, however, does not interfere with doctor-patient confi-
dentiality.123 In cases addressing this subject, the third parties to whom the
physician owed the duty were those who, as a result of their relationship
with the patient, were aware of the patient's medical status. 24 Thus, a phy-
sician who treats a patient with typhoid fever may be liable for failing to
inform the patient's family and hospital employees of the dangers associ-
ated with exposure to the disease.' 2 5 Similar liability has been found in
121. See Cooper, supra note 45, at 411-12. A physician's permissive authority to dis-
close patient information is based on the recognition that the patient's interests in confidential-
ity must be balanced against the societal interests in disclosure. Accordingly, physicians bear
the burden of balancing these interests. Not surprisingly, the lack of specific statutory lan-
guage either prohibiting or permitting the disclosure of confidential medical information in-
creases a physician's burden. Id. at 411. Furthermore, when the disclosure involves AIDS in-
formation, the burden of balancing societal and patient interests becomes even more
troublesome. Consequently, physicians need specific statutory guidance for the disclosure of
AIDS information. See infra notes 156-94 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921) (the court recog-
nized the physician's duty to inform the family of the patient about the patient's medical
condition and the infectious nature of the patient's disease). The Rodman court stated that
It is a sound rule of law that one who by reason of his professional relation is placed in a
position where it becomes his duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from injury
or danger is liable in damages to those who are injured by reason of his failure to exercise
such care.
Id. at 388, 227 S.W. at 614.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (hold-
ing that the information to be disclosed by a physician was the nature of the contagious disease
and the precautionary steps to be taken to prevent the patient from contracting such disease)
cert. denied, 245 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971).
125. See Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921) (duty owed to parents
of patients); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) (duty owed to father of
patient); Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (duty owed to
minor child of patient); Edwards v. Lamb, 69 N.H. 599, 45 A. 480 (1899) (duty owed to wife
of patient); Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928) (duty owed to patient's
neighbor who aided the patient prior to death and performed certain services in preparation for
the patient's burial after death).
In most situations, medical information can be shared with patient's relatives. However, if
the patient objects to the release of information, the information should not be shared with
members of his family. In general, the appropriateness of disclosure to family members de-
pends upon the purpose of the disclosure. An acceptable purpose is to warn family members of
the patient's contagious disease. M. MACDONALD, K. MEYER & B. ESSIG, supra note 39, at §
19.03[3].
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cases dealing with septic poison, 1 2 scarlet fever, 27 smallpox, 12 8 and tuber-
culosis.' 2 9 In each of these cases, however, the doctors were only required to
inform third parties of the diseases' communicable nature."30 Such informa-
tion is not confidential."'s Recently, however, legal scholars have expressed
concern about the possible expansion of the duty to inform about communi-
cable diseases."12 Such an expansion has already occurred in the area of
psychiatric care." 83
In Tarasoff v. Board of Regents"' the Supreme Court of California
found a psychotherapist liable for the wrongful death of a patient's former
girlfriend."35 In reaching its decision, the Tarasoff court relied on cases in
which doctors had been held liable to third persons for failure to warn
126. Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921).
127. Edwards v. Lamb, 69 N.H. 599, 45 A. 480 (1899).
128. Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919).
129. Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928).
130. Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied,
245 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971).
131. See, e.g., Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d at 753. The Hofmann court stated
that
a physician owes a duty to a minor child who is a member of the immediate family and
living with a patient suffering from a contagious disease to inform those charged with the
minor's well being of the nature of the contagious disease and the precautionary steps to
be taken to prevent the child from contracting such disease ...
Id.
In addition to informing those likely to come in contact with an infectious patient, a
physician is also duty-bound not to indicate to third parties that contact with an infectious
patient entails no risks. See Edwards v. Lamb, 69 N.H. 599, 45 A. 480 (1899) (physician
liable for negligently informing the plaintiff that there was no danger of infection from her
contagious husband).
The infectious nature of a patient's disease cannot be considered confidential information
since it is a medical fact independent of the physician-patient relationship. However, while a
disease's infectious nature is not confidential, the fact that a patient is diseased can be. See
generally Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. at 224, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920), which recog-
nized that information, such as infection with disease, is confidential information conveyed in
reliance on the confidential doctor-patient relationship. The Simonsen court, however, found
that although information given to a physician by his patient is confidential, if the patient's
disease is found to be dangerous and highly contagious, the physician is privileged to disclose
information necessary to prevent the spread of the disease. Id.
132. See 15 HEALTH LAWYERS NEWS REP., Aug. 1987, at 7 (noting that some legal
scholars have indicated that health care professionals have a duty to warn the sexual partners
of an AIDS carrier if the carrier poses a predictable risk to the partner).
133. See Note, The Duty to Warn Third Parties: A Retrospective on Tarasoff, 18
RUTGERS L.J. 145 (1986).
134. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
135. In Tarasoff, a patient confided to his university psychologist his intentions to kill
Tatiana Tarasoff. The psychologist had the patient briefly incarcerated by campus police, but
failed to warn Tarasoff of the patient's intentions. Two months later the patient killed
Tarasoff. Id.
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members of the patient's family about the patient's contagious disease.138
The court held that when a therapist determines, or should determine that
his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, the therapist
has a duty to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against
such danger.1 37 In Tarasoff, the court suggested that the duty to protect the
victim could have been fulfilled by warning the victim, or those persons
likely to apprise the victim, of the danger. 3 '
Critics have vigorously attacked the duty established in Tarasoff.13 9
Nevertheless, several jurisdictions have adopted and extended the duty to
warn."" In 1980, the Supreme Court of California further defined the scope
of the duty owed to third parties.' 4' In Thompson v. County of Alameda, 1 4
a county psychiatric patient killed the plaintiff's young son.' 43 In Thomp-
son, the plaintiff alleged that the county's mental health employee had a
duty to inform the victim's parents, local police, or parents in the victim's
community about the patient's violence toward young children. 44 In clari-
fying the Tarasoff duty, the Thompson court found no general duty to
warn."1 5 Instead, the court found that a psychotherapist has a duty to warn
identifiable third parties of foreseeable harm that a patient may cause. 14
136. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 339-40, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
137. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 345-46, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
138. Id. at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
139. See, e.g., Comment, The Psychiatric Duty to Warn: Walking a Tightrope of Un-
certainty, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 269 (1987) (courts' failure to define crucial elements of the duty
to warn); George, Korin, Quattrone & Mandel, The Therapist's Duty to Protect Third Par-
ties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 637 (1983) (duty to warn interferes with
effective psychotherapy); Karasu, The Ethics of Psychotherapy, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1502
(1980) (confidential relationship between psychotherapist and patient destroyed due to duty to
warn); Rath & Meisel, Dangerousness, Confidentiality, and the Duty to Warn, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 508 (1977) (duty to warn undercuts confidentiality of the therapeutic relation-
ship); Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 358 (1976) (duty to warn reduces the utility of psychotherapy); Note, Imposing a
Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists -A Judicial Threat to Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. COLO. L.
REV. 283 (1977) (patients' rights could be destroyed by duty to warn).
140. See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980) (duty to
warn extended to all persons foreseeably in danger of being injured by a patient's conduct);
Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (state hospital liable for failure to
confine mental patient who injured another); Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th
Cir. 1983) (psychotherapist has duty to protect a potential victim even though no actual
threats were made); Peck v. Counseling Serv. of Addison Co., Inc., 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422
(1985) (mental health professional has duty to protect third party from physical harm or prop-
erty damage caused by a patient).
141. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70
(1980).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
144. Id. at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
145. Id. at 752, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
146. Id. at 759, 614 P.2d at 735, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The Thompson court concluded
1989]
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This holding continues to be the standard for determining a psychothera-
pist's duty to warn third parties in California 47 as well as in other jurisdic-
tions across the country.
14 8
Although a duty to warn identifiable third parties has primarily af-
fected the mental health profession,1 49 the duty closely parallels the physi-
cian's duty to inform certain third parties of the infectious nature of a pa-
tient's disease. 50  Both psychotherapist-patient and physician-patient
relationships involve confidentiality, and in both relationships the confiden-
tiality must yield to the extent that disclosure is essential for the protection
of third parties.' 5' Accordingly, physicians who treat AIDS patients may
have a duty to warn a patient's family members'52 or sexual partners based
on a Tarasoff duty to warn. The requirement of an identifiable third party
who is foreseeably endangered by a patient's actions can be fulfilled in
AIDS cases since exposure to HIV may lead to infection and since family
members and sexual partners may be identifiable victims.1'5  Thus, a physi-
*cian who believes a third party is in danger of contracting AIDS via a pa-
that no duty to warn was owed to a segment of the general population where there were no
specific threats toward any specific victim.
147. See Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983) (The Jablonski court
found that a psychiatrist owed a duty to warn a patient's girlfriend since the girlfriend was a
foreseeable victim of the patient's violence. The court found this duty despite the lack of spe-
cific threats concerning any specific individuals. However, the court concluded that the pa-
tient's medical history placed the psychiatrist on notice of the patient's violent propensity to-
ward women who were very close to him. Thus, the patient's girlfriend was an identifiable
foreseeable victim, although not specifically identified by the patient).
148. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
149. But see Mangeris v. Gordon, 94 Nev. 400, 580 P.2d 481 (1981) (Tarasoff-like
analysis applied to a massage parlor operator who failed to warn a taxicab driver that a patron
had a criminal history and was a fugitive of the law); Leblang, The Duty to Warn Third
Parties Threatened by a Patient, 10 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRACT., Sept. 1982, 5 (detail of
judicial interpretations of the Tarasoff doctrine in jurisdictions other than California); Milne,
"Bless Me Father, for I Am About to Sin...... Should Clergy Counselors Have a Duty to
Protect Third Parties?, 22 TULSA L.J. 139 (1986) (application of Tarasoff to clergy); Sands,
The Attorney's Affirmative Duty to Warn Foreseeable Victims of a Client's Intended Violent
Assault, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 355 (1986) (discussion of the application of the Tarasoff duty to
warn to attorneys).
150. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Board of Regents, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958) (doctor who warned
patient's fiancee of his syphilis was successful in defending against patient's claim of breach of
confidence).
153. Some AIDS patients may develop AIDS-related psychiatric disorders, which may
cause a patient to become disorganized, agitated, confused, belligerent, impulsive, hypersexual,
violent, or assaultive. A patient suffering from an AIDS-related psychiatric disorder may be
unable to abide by infection-control guidelines, and thus, in certain cases, a family member
may be a foreseeable victim. See Navia & Price, Dementia Complicating AIDS, 16 PSYCHIAT-
RIC ANNALS 158 (1986).
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tient must make a decision: inform the third party and face potential liabil-
ity for breach of confidentiality,15' or maintain confidentiality and face
potential liability for failure to satisfy a Tarasoff-like duty to warn.' 56 The
possible repercussions of the disclosure of confidential AIDS information
aggravate this quandary.
IV. AIDS AND CONFIDENTIALITY-CONFLICTING CONCERN
Medical ethics, statutes, and common law generally guide a physician's
disclosure of a patient's medical information. Physicians who treat AIDS
patients, like psychotherapists or physicians who treat typhoid, must follow
the appropriate professional guidelines.Y56 AIDS, however, is a unique dis-
ease, and the standards that physicians have previously applied to deter-
mine the appropriateness of the disclosure of patient information are no
longer suitable. The disclosure of information pertaining to an AIDS pa-
tient requires a rebalancing of the private and public interests involved and
a redrafting of the parameters of liability surrounding the disclosure of pa-
tient information. 57
A. The Concerns of AIDS Victims and Their Physicians
The object of allowing recovery for a breach of confidentiality is to
compensate for the resulting injuries. 58 The injuries suffered by patients
whose medical records are improperly disclosed by their physicians may in-
clude harm to reputation, interference with personal privacy, personal hu-
miliation, loss of employment, and emotional distress.' 5 These injuries have
commonly been suffered by AIDS victims upon publicity of their plight.'60
154. Belitsky & Solomon, Doctors and Patients: Responsibilities in a Confidential Rela-
tionship, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 201 (H. Dalton & S. Burris eds.
1987).
155. See supra notes 83-107 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 119-149 and accompanying text.
157. Murphy, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 147
(1980).
158. See Note, Public Health Protection and the Privacy of Medical Records, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 265, 303 (1983) (concluding that the problem of secondary disclo-
sures to private third parties demands a response, be it common law development, regulatory
schemes, or legislative acts).
159. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 802 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (approval of action for damages directly caused by breach of confidence); Simonsen v.
Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 227, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (breach of confidentiality would give
rise to a civil action for the damages naturally flowing from such wrong); Berry v. Moench, 8
Utah 2d 191, 193, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (1958) (finding an action would lie for any injury suf-
fered as a result of a breach of confidence).
160. See Winslade, supra note 38, at 505.
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Since the disease can be transmitted from one person to another, 16 and
because the future for a person who develops AIDS is almost certainly
death, 162 individuals diagnosed as having AIDS face discrimination and so-
cial ostracism based upon the fear of contagion. 63 Although a person af-
flicted with AIDS may be able to recover damages from the party from
whom the disease was contracted,'6 a physician who improperly discloses
information regarding a patient's affliction with AIDS also becomes a po-
tential source of recovery.' 5 As a result, physicians should be extremely
cautious in handling and discussing the medical records of AIDS victims.
The near certainty of harm that AIDS patients suffer upon public disclo-
sure of their illness, and the severity of that harm, creates a potential for
economic loss and professional damage to an unwary physician. 66
Despite the potentially damaging consequences of public disclosure of
an AIDS victim's condition, persons afflicted with AIDS should not be af-
forded absolute confidentiality. Consequently, a physician may have a duty
to disclose certain information to a third party.' 1 In addition to protecting
AIDS patient's from being injured by unauthorized disclosures, confidenti-
ality also may help curb the spread of AIDS. 8 The testing and counseling
161. See supra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
162. See Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 35
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 757 (1986).
163. M. MACDONALD, K. MEYER & B. ESSIG, supra note 39, at § 19.05[4].
164. See generally id.; Comment, Running From Fear Itself. Analyzing Employment
Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS and Other Communicable Diseases Under Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 23 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 857, 861 (1987)
("[P]ublic fear of AIDS has remained high since its first documentation by the Center For
Disease Control (CDC) in 1981 because the disease in its final stage is at present incurable
and frequently fatal .... ) (quoting Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons
With AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 681, 696 (1985)).
165. See 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Feb. 25, 1987 at 6 (woman filed suit against former
fiancee claiming he exposed her to the HIV virus); AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 12, at
150-54.
166. 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Feb. 25, 1987 at 6. On Feb. 5, 1987, a California man
filed a suit against his physician charging a violation of California's AIDS Testing Confidenti-
ality Act (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West 1982)). The California man claimed
that his HIV positive status was being used to prevent his collection of compensation for an
unrelated head injury suffered two years ago.
167. See generally Peter & Sanchez, The Therapist's Duty to Disclose Communicable
Diseases, 14 W. ST. U.L. REv. 465, 472-73 (1987) (discussing the duty of confidentiality with
respect to communicable diseases).
168. A reflection of this duty can be observed in contact-tracing and partner-notification
plans. Under these plans, a state department of health could contact an HIV-infected person's
sexual or needle-sharing partners for testing and counseling. See IDAHO CODE § 39-601
(1987). These plans require physicians to disclose a patient's AIDS information to the respec-
tive health department and then allow the health department to disclose information regarding
a patient's AIDS status to third parties. Such plans, nevertheless, fail to relieve physicians of
their potential liability to third parties or their potential liability for breach of confidentiality if
a third party is notified of a patient's infection. Consequently, even though a state may provide
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of those who might be exposed to HIV are the principle measures available
for the reduction of the transmission of AIDS.16 9 To motivate the individu-
als at risk to be counseled and tested, physicians must ensure
confidentiality. 170
Although medical ethics and most state laws permit breaching patient
confidentiality in certain situations, disclosure that a patient tested positive
for AIDS may not be such a situation. Unlike a positive test for typhoid,"'
or a psychotherapy patient's confession of an intent to kill," 2 a positive test
for HIV infection does not clearly indicate a foreseeable harm to an identi-
fiable individual.1 7 3 Thus, given the uncertainty involved with warning a
patient's associates, a physician must speculate whether any warning would
be worth the harm the individual could suffer through embarrassment and
discrimination.
B. The Concerns of Third Parties and Physicians
AIDS is a communicable disease which poses a predictable risk to
other persons. 74 If a physician can identify a person who may become in-
fected by a patient, the physician likely has a duty to warn the other per-
son. 175 In general, a physician has a duty to keep a patient's medical history
and condition confidential." 6 This duty, however, is not absolute.' The
legislation that notifies parties at risk of being infected, such legislation is not sufficient to
indicate what physicians' duties and liabilities are with respect to the disclosure of AIDS
information.
169. 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, May 6, 1987 at 2 (reporting that the U.S. Surgeon Gen-
eral and other public health experts endorse the guarantee of confidentiality, saying that ef-
forts to stem the spread of AIDS cannot succeed without the assurance of confident-
iality).
170. See 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Jul. 2, 1986, at 7 (confidentiality is crucial to insure
that individuals at high risk for AIDS are motivated to be counseled and tested); 1 AIDS
POLICY & LAW, Nov. 5, 1986, at 8 (mandatory disclosure of patients' positive tests for AIDS
would discourage AIDS victims from seeking help).
171. See Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921).
172. See Tarasoff v. Board of Regents, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976).
173. CONFROITING AIDS, supra note 6, at 189-91; AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note
12, at 158.
174. CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 6, at 57-73.
175. See AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 12, at 252. The means by which AIDS is
transmitted, however, and the severe discrimination which accompanies its diagnosis, have
raised several arguments in opposition to the duty to warn. See generally Dolgin, supra note
20.
176. See Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 1426,
1455 (1982) (recognizing tortious breach of confidence as a distinct basis of liability).
177. See, e.g., notes 108-53 and accompanying text; CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(b) (West
1982) (listing of seven circumstances under which a physician must disclose medical informa-
tion regarding a patient); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980)
1989]
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physician's duty of confidentiality is limited by the Tarasoff duty to warn
identifiable third parties who foreseeably might be harmed by a patient's
conduct.118 Because AIDS is contagious, a sexual partner's or intravenous
needle-sharer's ignorance of an AIDS patient's condition could be fatal.
17 1
Furthermore, because of neuropsychiatric complications, an AIDS patient
may not be able to abide by reasonable infection-control guidelines; thus, a
family member's ignorance of a patient's AIDS condition may be danger-
ous.180 Consequently, a physician may have a duty to inform sexual part-
ners, intravenous needle-sharers, and family members that a patient has
AIDS. 81 However, the mere fact that a patient has AIDS does not necessa-
rily indicate that the patient is a danger to third parties.182 Furthermore,
not all AIDS patients develop neuropsychiatric complications; thus, not all
patients will pose a risk to family members. 13 Consequently, without ex-
plicit statutory provisions that allow a physician to disclose to those identifi-
able third parties who are in danger of being infected or harmed by an
AIDS patient, the physician must also consider the possible liability for
breach of confidentiality.
A physician's decision to disclose AIDS information to a third party
must be determined by resolving two conflicting policy concerns. The first
concern is the need to protect third parties from infection or other injury by
the patient through appropriate disclosure of relevant medical informa-
tion.' The second is the need to administer health care in a manner that
will encourage those who have been exposed to AIDS to seek testing and
treatment. 85 Since confidentiality competes with the duty toward third par-
ties, physicians are in need of guidelines through which they will be pro-
tected from liability for their decision to disclose or not to disclose the infor-
mation that a patient has AIDS.
(holding a physician must disclose confidential patient information to persons foreseeably en-
dangered by the patient's condition).
178. Tarasoff v. Board of Regents, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976).
179. See Felberbaum, Epidemiology and Risk Factors Associated with AIDS, 9 Topics
EMERGENCY MEDICINE 1, 9 (1987).
180. Belitsky & Solomon, Doctors and Patients: Responsibilities in a Confidential Rela-
tionship, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 201, 208 (H. Dalton & S. Burris
eds. 1987).
181. Id. at 207-08.
182. Since AIDS is primarily spread through high risk activities, abstinence from these
risk activities will prevent the spread of AIDS. See United States Department of Health and
Human Services Public Health Service, AIDS Information Bulletin: the Public Health Service
Response to AIDS (1985).
183. See Rundell, Wise & Ursano, Three Cases of AIDS-Related Psychiatric Disor-
ders, 143 AM. J. PSYCH. 777 (1986).
184. See Mills, Wofsy & Mills, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Infection
Control and Public Health Law, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 931-33 (1986).
185. 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW, July 2, 1986 at 7.
[Vol. 23
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C. Legislative Action as a Cure to Physicians' Dilemma
The problem facing physicians who treat or diagnose AIDS patients is
a lack of guidance as to whom a patient's confidential information can be
disclosed. Physicians receive a modicum of guidance through state reporting
statutes, which mandate disclosure to state officials or agencies,"8" and con-
fidentiality statutes, which require physicians to keep patient information
confidential. 8 7 Despite the existence of reporting and confidentiality stat-
utes, however, states presently lack legislation that explicitly governs physi-
cians' disclosure of confidential AIDS information to non-official third par-
ties. 88 An effective solution to physicians' lack of governance would be a
definitive statute that indicates to whom, under what conditions, and how
AIDS information could be disclosed. Such a statute could solve the physi-
cians' predicament of determining whether the risk of failing to warn a
third party is greater than the risk of breaching confidentiality, and thus
could free doctors from potential litigation.
A recently enacted North Carolina law requires the physician of a per-
son infected with AIDS to provide a state health official with the name of
the patient's spouse.8 9 Upon receiving the spouse's name, North Carolina
provides a "trained, compassionate counselor" to counsel the spouse.190
Statutes like North Carolina's may accomplish the goal of protecting third
parties from possibly contracting AIDS.' 91 Such statutes, however, do not
relieve a physician from the potential liability for failure to warn third par-
ties and thus are not a complete solution to the physician's dilemma.
In proposing statutory guidelines for physicians, the two competing
policy concerns surrounding confidentiality must be considered.' 9' The goal
of protecting third parties from infection can be achieved by carefully defin-
ing the situations in which the potential harm is severe enough to require
disclosure and by defining the manner in which the information would be
disclosed. To achieve the second goal, the administration of health care in a
186. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 56.10(c) (West 1982). California, having spawned the
Tarasoff doctrine, and having one of the most comprehensive statutes regulating physician's
disclosure of confidential information, does not have any provisions for the disclosure of medi-
cal information when a physician believes a patient poses a danger to a third party.
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-147 (1987).
190. See 2 AIDS POLICY & LAW, Jan. 13, 1988 at 7 (quoting Chris Hoke, Chief of the
Office of Legal Assistance in the North Carolina Department of Human Resourses' Division of
Health Services).
191. Id.
192. See generally Peter & Sanchez, The Therapist's Duty to Disclose Communicable
Diseases, 14 W. ST. U.L. REv. 465, 477 (1987) (discussing the conflicting interests of ther-
apists, patients, and society in the disclosure of the fact that a patient has a disease).
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manner promoting testing and treatment, the legislation must provide a rea-
sonable alternative to a physician's disclosure. In addition, limitations upon
the type of information to be disclosed should be included. This note pro-
poses legislation to accommodate both policy concerns. A statute designed
to accommodate these concerns should be phrased as follows:
AIDS PREVENTION THROUGH NOTIFICATION ACT
Section 1. Purpose. In response to increasing public and health care con-
cerns regarding Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), this Act
allows health care providers who treat or diagnose patients with AIDS to
disclose that the patient is an Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) car-
rier to third parties who foreseeably may contract AIDS from or be harmed
by the patient. Compliance with this statute safeguards health care provid-
ers who wish to disclose patient AIDS information from liability for breach
of confidentiality, while maintaining the integrity of the professional-patient
confidentiality.
Section 2. Definitions.
1) "Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome" (AIDS) is a severe manifes-
tation of infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) charac-
terized by
a) one or more opportunistic diseases that are indicative of an underly-
ing immunity disorder,
b) an absence of all other causes of immunodeficiency other than HIV,
and
c) the absence of all other causes of reduced resistance associated with
one or more of the opportunistic infections.
2) "Health Care Provider" means any person duly licensed by this State to
provide health care services. Such persons shall include, but not be limited
to, physicians, nurses, psychiatrists, or psychologists.
3) "Patient" is any natural person who received health care services from a
health care provider and to whom the medical information pertains.
4) "Endangered Individual" is a person whose identity can be reasonably
determined from information expressly or implicitly provided by the pa-
tient, and who is one or more of the following:
a) spouse of patient; or
b) sexual partner of patient; or
c) immediate family members of patient; or
d) other person likely to share an intravenous needle with the patient.
Section 3. Confidentiality. Except as outlined in Section 4, no part of this
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statute shall be construed as an authorization to physicians to breach their
ethical or statutory duty of confidentiality. Any physician who discloses or
fails to protect a patient's confidential medical information in contravention
of Section 4 of this Act shall be liable to that patient for all harm caused by
such disclosure.
Section 4. Disclosure. A health care provider engaged in the treatment or
diagnosis of AIDS patients must disclose to an endangered individual the
medical status of the patient with AIDS if such disclosure may prevent the
individual from contracting AIDS or from being harmed as a result of the
patient's affliction with AIDS. Since, pursuant to this Act, the disclosure of
confidential information is mandatory, any information so disclosed must be
disclosed as defined in Section 5 of this statute.
Section 5. Implementation.
1) A health care provider shall make a disclosure of a patient's confidential
AIDS information to an endangered third party in the following manner:
a) First, upon the determination of the need for disclosure a health
care provider shall attempt to persuade the infected patient to voluntarily
disclose to the endangered individual that the patient is a carrier of AIDS.
If the patient refuses, or the health care provider has reason to believe the
patient will not comply with the requested voluntary disclosure, then
b) the health care provider shall inform the patient of the intended
disclosure and shall attempt to secure the patient's consent to reveal to the
endangered individual that the patient has AIDS. Once the health care pro-
vider has informed the patient of the intended disclosure, the provider shall
disclose to the endangered individual that the patient is infected with
AIDS.
2) A health care provider who in good faith discloses confidential AIDS
information to an endangered individual in the manner described in subsec-
tion 1) of Section 5 shall be immune from any civil liability which may
arise from a disclosure made in compliance with this Act.
V. CONCLUSION
The epidemic of AIDS and the judicial expansion of the Tarasoff duty
to warn have intensified the conflict between patient confidentiality and a
physician's duty to warn third parties. The present-day stigma attached to
AIDS and the discrimination suffered by AIDS carriers enhance a physi-
cian's duty to maintain patient confidences. However, the severity of AIDS
and the predictable means by which it is transmitted intensify the physi-
cian's duty to warn third parties whom the physician identifies as being
endangered by the AIDS patient. Current judicially imposed parameters of
liability provide insufficient guidance to physicians who wish to protect their
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patients from disclosure of confidential information, third parties from con-
tracting AIDS, and themselves from possible lawsuits for breach of confi-
dentiality or failure to warn. Legislative adoption of a definitive statute that
specifies a physician's discretionary right to disclose AIDS information is
needed. Carefully drawn legislative regulations that govern a physician's
disclosure to endangered third parties of a patient's confidential AIDS in-
formation and provide an accompanying grant of civil immunity to the phy-
sician for good faith disclosures are the most appropriate means of protect-
ing patients and their physicians in the midst of the AIDS crisis.
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